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The Seminole Tribe and the Origins of Indian Gaming
Matthew L.M. Fletcher
The Seminole Tribe of Florida (“Tribe”) has played, perhaps, the most
important role in the origins and development of Indian gaming in the
United States of any single tribe. The Tribe opened the first tribally owned,
high stakes bingo hall in 1979.1 The Tribe, in 1981, was involved in one of
the earliest lower court decisions, which formed the basis of the legal theory
excluding most states from the regulation of high stakes bingo,2 a theory
that Congress largely codified in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA) years later.3 The Tribe was a party to the Supreme Court decision
in 1996 that radically altered the bargaining power between tribes and states
over the negotiation and regulation of casino-style gaming under IGRA.4
And more recently, the Tribe has been a leading participant in negotiations
and litigation over the regulatory landscape of Indian gaming after the 1996
decision.5 The Tribe is one of the most successful Indian gaming tribes in
the nation.
This paper traces that history, but also offers thoughts on how the
culture and traditional governance structures of the Seminole Tribe played a
part in its leadership role in the arena of Indian gaming. Part I surveys
traditional Seminole governance structures, leading into Part II, which
surveys the recent history of the Tribe, including the origins of their gaming
industry. Parts III and IV discuss the Tribe’s involvement in major Indian
gaming litigation and negotiation.

 Professor of Law and Director of the Indigenous Law and Policy Center, Michigan State
University College of Law. Thanks to Alex Pearl. I write about the Seminole Tribe of Florida with no
prior experience or expertise on that Indian nation, and I do so with the greatest respect and humility.
1 See JESSICA R. CATTELINO, HIGH STAKES: FLORIDA SEMINOLE GAMING AND SOVEREIGNTY 1
(2008). The Keweenaw Bay Indian Community enacted the first modern tribal gaming ordinance in
1974, but no casino appeared there until 1983. See Bradley T. Dakota, The Father of Indian Casino
Gaming,
20:1
INDIAN
GAMING,
Jan.
2010,
at
44,
available
at
http://www.indiangaming.com/istore/Jan10_Dakota.pdf.
2 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1020 (1982).
3 See Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et
seq.).
4 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
5 See State of Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 181 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 1999); Florida
House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied sub nom., Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida House of Representatives, 555 U.S. 1212 (2009).
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TRADITIONAL SEMINOLE GOVERNANCE.

The modern incarnation of the Seminole Tribe of Florida was built on
conflict, and the tribal governance structures, which continue to inform
tribal decision-making, adapted to meet that conflict. Nineteenth century
conflict between the Seminoles and outsiders was unusually violent and
forced the Seminole Tribe to develop a culture of governance that all but
thrived on conflict. As with so many other tribes, the Seminole governance
culture became one of survival.
According to commentators, warfare was an important means of
positive disruption and regeneration for the Maskókî (or Muscogee, or
Creek, in its Americanized form) nations, which include the modern
Seminole Tribe:
Warfare calibrated and recalibrated intertribal relations. It provided
the single most valuable, and viable, path to preferment for males (and,
in certain instances, for females), and mixed and remixed
marriageability options for females, among other critical processes.
The core and plurality of items wrapped into the Medicine bundle . . .
always were war-related items.6
The Seminoles, who today largely descend from Miccosukee (or Mikasuki)
language speakers, and their relatives, allies, and partners who largely
spoke Maskókî, participated in numerous wars with American forces in the
nineteenth century: this ultimate series of the United States Wars of Indian
Removal east of the Mississippi River would be fought against descendants
of many of the same Maskókî tribes, as the Creek Wars of 1813-14 (in
Alabama); the Creek War of 1836 (in Georgia); and the First (1817-18);
Second (1935-42), and Third (1856-58) Seminole Wars (in Florida).7 These
were thoroughly devastating military conflicts that shape Seminole
governance to this day. The federal government removed most Seminoles
to the Oklahoma Indian Territory after the conclusion of these wars.8
Of the Miccosukee and Maskókî Indians who settled permanently in
what is now the State of Florida, there are three main entities. There is the
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida and the Seminole Tribe of Florida,
both federally recognized tribes, and there is a group of independent
traditional Seminoles who decline membership in either Tribe.9 Much of
what will be said here about the Seminole Tribe is true for the Miccosukee
6 PATRICIA RILES WICKMAN, WARRIORS WITHOUT WAR: SEMINOLE LEADERSHIP IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 2-3 (2012).
7 See generally JAMES W. COVINGTON, THE SEMINOLES OF FLORIDA 28-144 (1993).
8 See HARRY A. KERSEY, JR., AN ASSUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION AMONG THE FLORIDA SEMINOLES 1953-1979 at 13 (1996).
9
See WICKMAN, supra note 6, at 4.
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Tribe, though these tribes have followed parallel but different paths.
Prior to reorganization in 1957, Seminole governance was
decentralized. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Seminoles
lived in loosely organized, family camps that one commentator argues
“were not even bands in the strict sense of the term because they lacked a
recognized chief or leader.”10 Seminole bands might have elected a leader,
but perhaps did not need to, as an Interior Department official noted in
1899, “[t]he tribe has no head chief at present. In accordance with the
oldest customs the office was elective.”11
The strongest organizations were “busk groups . . . headed by a
medicine man and council of elders.”12 An 1894 news report, quoting a
Washington D.C. muckety-muck, described that year’s Green Corn
ceremonies:
The Seminoles keep up their annual feast, which is called the green
corn dance. It takes place during the first quarter of the moon in June.
All the living members of the tribe gather at the neighborhood of Chief
Tallahassee’s abode at this period. Then all their laws are made and
they pow-wow for days and days until all have been heard who have
anything to suggest for the good of the tribe or for their entertainment.
This is also the popular time for weddings, and often a dozen
marriages are celebrated while the green corn dance continues.13
Even wars with the Americans stopped during Green Corn ceremonies.14
Each year during Green Corn ceremonies, the elders met to discuss the
previous year’s criminal incidents, an event sometimes called “court day.”15
Seminole criminal penalties could be brutal, with ears and noses clipped,
banishments, and even executions.16 In 1938, after efforts to rehabilitate an
alcoholic Seminole who had committed two murders failed, evidenced
when he assaulted a pregnant woman, a Seminole elder named John

10

KERSEY, AN ASSUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at 13.
Last of Their Tribe; Seminoles Indians Cling to Their Ancient Traditions; Uncle Sam’s
Queerest Wards, WASH. POST., May 21, 1899, at 24.
12
KERSEY, AN ASSUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at 13.
13
See WASH. POST., Dec. 4, 1894, at 12.
14
See The Indian Aggressions—Prospects of War—Supplies of the Enemy, N.Y. HERALD, Aug.
24, 1849, at 4.
15
See KERSEY, AN ASSUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at 150; see also Court Ruling
Lifts Spirits of Seminoles, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1967, at L6 (“The climax of the five-day [Green Corn]
festival is Court day. In the presence of the Seminoles’ sacred medicine bundle, a council of elders
formulates policy and decides the punishment of any Indians who have broken the tribal laws during the
year.”).
16
See COVINGTON, supra note 7, at 150-51; see also Court Ruling Lifts Spirits of Seminoles,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1967, at L6 (“The usual penalty is social banishment, but in modern times at least
one unrepentant murderer was sentenced to death by the elders.”).
11
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Osceola executed the culprit, a man named Johnny Billy, with a shotgun.17
Seminole elders, referred to by academics as medicine men, shaman, and
guardians of sacred bundles, treated the sick, and advised the community on
governance issues.18
In a 1913 report to Congress, Lucien A. Spencer, Special
Commissioner to the Florida Seminoles, confirmed that the Seminole’s
tribal governance was patriarchal and that most tribal governance business
took place at the Green Corn Dance:
The Seminole government is patriarchal in form, the oldest man in the
family being the patriarch. The heads of the different families then
form a council, which is the supreme court of the tribe. The principal
business of the tribe is transacted at the Shot-Cataw or green corn
dance. The entire tribe is assembled at this time. The meeting lasts
four days, from the “little moon” in July, and is a politico-religious
festival which includes ceremonies of purification, endurance, and
skill. The “black drink” is still given, and acts as an emetic and a
purge. The boys are still initiated into the “mysteries” by the older
men, who place live coals upon them.19
A few years later, the Seminole Indian Agency reported to Congress
that, outside of the Green Corn ceremonial governance activities, local
governance was very strict and successful at maintaining the rule of law,
much to the implied satisfaction of the local non-Indian governments:
The Seminoles are an orderly people. They are divided into bands
each under a headman who enforces strict discipline and requires
perfect obedience to the unwritten code. When a statutory law is
broken it is due to ignorance, and when the laws are made known to an
Indian, no second case of violation has ever been recorded against
them. The local courts recognize this fact, and usually the judges seek
to impress upon an Indian who is undergoing trial the nature of the law
that he has broken, knowing that he will carry the news of this law to
his people and thus prevent it from being broken again.
The tribal laws of the Indians are just and inflexible, and if one
is violated the erring one accepts the penalty, even though it be death
itself, without a protest.
Indian-custom marriage still prevails, but such marriages are
more binding among them than legal marriages are among white

17
18
19

1913).

See COVINGTON, supra note 7, at 151.
See id. at 151-53.
LUCIEN A. SPENCER, SEMINOLE INDIANS IN FLORIDA, S. REP. DOC. NO. 63-42, at 5 (1st Sess.
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people.20
The report further establishes that Seminoles respect private property, and
do not gamble:
Probably no people on earth have a higher standard of morality than
the Florida Seminoles, and it is not a single standard.
The Indians have a high respect for property rights, and theft and
lying are serious crimes in their unwritten code.
Gambling is unknown among them.21
The report also notes, possibly to the surprise of its readers, that
Seminole women were highly respected community members:
The domestic life of the Florida Seminoles offers a great contrast to
that of most other Indians. The women are treated with much
consideration and their wishes control family policy. The women
perform the greater part of the work about the camps, but not as
menials; for indeed, they are quite independent, and are the financiers
of the home.22
Twentieth-century American feminists could have used Seminole
traditions to effectively shame American misogynists, noting that Seminole
women have always voted in tribal elections when they turn eighteen, in
accordance with tribal tradition: “[s]ince time immemorial [women] have
had a voice in their government, and have voted when they reached the age
of 18.”23 Moreover, Seminole children took the names of their mothers, and
Seminole husbands deferred to their mothers-in-law: “[i]f Willie Gopher
marries Jennie Jumper, their children take the name of Jumper, not Gopher.
Not only does the brave take his wife’s family name, but he lives in the
camp of his wife’s family and is openly subject to the wishes of his motherin-law.”24
After the Bureau of Indian Affairs established three reservations in
Florida in the 1930s and 1940s,25 to which some but not all Seminoles
moved, the traditional governance structure became fractured.26 The

20
LUCIEN A. SPENCER, SPECIAL REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SEMINOLE AGENCY, S. REP. DOC. NO.
67-102, at 3 (2d Sess. 1921).
21
Id.
22
Id. at 3-4.
23
See Helen Van Hoy Smith, Seminoles Have Happy Hunting Ground in Dixie, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., June 23, 1940, at G6.
24
See id.
25
See R.T. King, Clan Affiliation and Leadership among the Twentieth Century Florida Indians,
55:2 FLA. HIST. Q. 138, 138 (1976).
26
See KERSEY, AN ASSUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at 14.
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government reintroduced a cattle herd to Seminoles in the 1930s as well.27
As early as 1932, Roy Nash’s Survey of the Seminole Indians of Florida
reported that fewer and fewer Seminoles attended the annual Green Corn
ceremonies.28 The New Deal era brought a permanent federal presence to
the Seminole communities in the form of a federal Indian agency, and also
initiated a stronger foothold of Christianity into the Seminole
communities.29 Since the 1950s, “the civil influence of the medicine
keepers, and hence the Panther clan, has declined. There are several
reasons for this, but most significant seems to be the activity of the Baptist
missionaries.”30
In 1957, the Secretary of Interior held elections over a proposed
constitution and federal charter of incorporation, and the Seminole Tribe
electorate overwhelmingly approved them both.31 Traditional governance
structures of Seminoles suffered, as they had so often in other Indian
communities nationally after the establishment of constitutional and
corporate governance structures:
This organization was directed and shaped both by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and by representatives of the Baptist church. Medicine
keepers had no place in the governmental structures which developed;
they and their councils of elders gave way to elected chairmen,
presidents, and reservation representatives. Under this theoretically
democratic system, a single clan has provided most of the presidents
and chairmen. Comprised of only about one-fifth of the Seminole
population, this clan is smaller than the one which provides the
medicine keepers.32
After the enactment of the Indian Claims Commission Act, the
Seminoles filed claims in 1950 seeking compensation for four federal land
takings of approximately 40 million acres, and claiming more than $47
million in damages.33 They fought off Department of Justice efforts to
dismiss the claims, and an effort by the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma to
take over the claim.34 The Miccosukee Tribe unsuccessfully sought to be
27

See COVINGTON, supra note 7, at 212-13.
See ROY NASH, SURVEY OF SEMINOLE INDIANS OF FLORIDA 26 (1932) (reprinted in S. DOC.
71-314 (3d Sess.)).
29 See id. at 19-32.
30 King, supra note 25, at 143.
31 See COVINGTON, supra note 7, at 242.
32 King, supra note 25, at 138.
33 Harry A. Kersey Jr., The Florida Seminole Land Claims Case, 1950-1990, 72:1 FLA. HIST. Q.
35, 38 (1993).
34 See id. at 38-39; see also COVINGTON, supra note 7, at 235 (“Matters become somewhat
confused when the Seminoles from Oklahoma filed a petition in 1951 with the Indian Claims
Commission asserting that the Florida Seminoles were actually ‘outlaws’ and that all awards should be
28
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excluded from the claims, arguing that to allow the adjudication of the
claims would foreclose their rights to reclaim the land.35 Later, in 1962, the
Miccosukees attempted to intervene and participate in the award, but the
motion to intervene failed.36 In 1970, two decades after the Seminoles filed
the claim, the Commission recommended that Congress award more than
$12 million to the Tribe.37 After settlement, the Florida Seminoles, the
Oklahoma Seminoles, and the Miccosukees agreed to a revised judgment of
$16 million.38 Due to intertribal conflicts, the distribution of the judgment
took another fourteen years.39
The early years of official federal recognition further undermined
traditional governance. During this period, the Seminoles faced down
Congress and defeated efforts to enact legislation that would terminate the
relationship between the Federal Government and the Seminole Tribe.40
The 1950s—the heart of the termination era of federal Indian policy—were
not good years for an Indian tribe to be reorganizing from a traditional to a
constitutional and corporate form of government. Generally speaking, the
Seminoles governed themselves through consensus and the strictures
imposed by the elders. But the 1957 Constitution and corporate charter
required Seminoles to elect leaders, who might or might not have valuable
skills as leaders, or be respected by the community enough to be followed.41
One expert argues that “[t]he Seminoles’ willingness to accept their
leadership may also indicate that Christianity provided a vehicle for
legitimizing a behavioral pattern—telling others what to do—that was
objectionable in traditional Seminole culture.”42 Interestingly, it appears the
tribal electorate voted in individuals from the traditional leadership clans of
the traditional White town moiety for nearly all of the first few decades of
elections, imposing a layer of traditional governance on the constitutional
and corporate structures adopted in 1957.43

paid to the Oklahoma Seminoles.”).
35
See Kersey, supra note 33, at 40.
36
See id. at 42-43.
37
See Seminole Indians of the State of Florida v. United States, 24 Ind. Cl. Comm. 1, 20 (1970);
Kersey, supra note 33, at 43.
38
See Seminole Indians of the State of Florida v. United States, 38 Ind. Cl. Comm. 62, 91
(1976); see also Kersey, supra note 33, at 43-44.
39
See Kersey, supra note 33, at 45.
40
See KERSEY, AN ASSUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at 23-50.
41
See id. at 81-82.
42
Id. at 82.
43
See King, supra note 25, at 149-51.
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SEMINOLE GOVERNANCE CULTURE AND THE ORIGINS OF INDIAN HIGH
STAKES BINGO.

Twentieth century style conflict between the Seminole Tribe and
opposing governments also drove the rise of Indian gaming in Florida.
While intergovernmental conflict no longer emphasized violence and
warfare as in the nineteenth century, modern conflicts that relied on law
enforcement rhetoric and litigation served the same purpose as military
conflict. This section attempts to show that local government opposition
through conflict to Seminole gaming was far less effective at limiting the
spread of gaming. In fact, antagonistic conflict all but ensured that
Seminole gaming would be at the forefront of Seminole nationhood for
decades to come.
Seminole tribal governance, as with so many other tribes, received a
huge boost when the federal government conclusively turned away from
termination toward self-determination. In the 1960s, the government
authorized some tribes to establish housing authorities, “apparently the first
examples of . . . the Executive branch treating Indian tribes like real
governments . . . .”44 Prior to 1970, the Federal Government heavily
governed Indian country, even the internal workings of tribal governments
in most important respects.45 Congress appropriated Indian affairs money
to the Department of Interior, which then administered federal programs top
to bottom in Indian country. The Bureau of Indian Affairs administered
tribal justice systems, health, public safety, and even basic and fundamental
tribal governance activities like tribal elections and tribal membership
decisions. Further, as Chairman Billie noted, much of tribal governance
activity depended on federal grants.
In the 1970s, Congress finally turned to a policy of tribal selfdetermination, embodied in the 1975 Indian Self-Determination and

44
PHILIP S. DELORIA, THE ERA OF INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION: AN OVERVIEW, IN INDIAN
SELF-RULE: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 191,
194 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986).
45
See generally C. Blue Clark, How Bad It Really Was Before World War II: Sovereignty, 23
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 175, 186 (1998) (“After 1900, Interior Department personnel in the BIA
intervened in American Indian governmental activities across the United States, ignored tribal elected
members’ wishes, and manipulated Indian people, resources, and tribal institutions.”); Richard Schifter,
Trends in Federal Indian Administration, 15 S.D. L. REV. 1, 1 (1970) (“In an earlier period in the history
of Federal-Indian relations the decisions and policies of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs were the
most important factors determining the course of Indian life. At the reservation level, Indians looked to
the agency superintendent, the local representative of the Commissioner, whose role vis-à-vis the
reservation Indian could best be analogized to the lord of the manor in the feudal era, who acted as the
supreme governmental authority and also attempted to regulate the personal life of the people under his
jurisdiction. Indians had come to accept the authority of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to regulate their
lives and had in many instances developed a feeling of dependence on the Bureau.”).
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Education Assistance Act.46 Though the Act granted tribes the right and
opportunity to take over federal administration of tribal programming,
congressional appropriations did not improve, and have declined steadily
ever since. Moreover, many tribal governments were unprepared in the
early years of self-determination to administer federal programs and their
auditing and reporting requirements, which require significant expertise, as
evidenced by the experience of the Seminole Tribe. In the first two decades
of tribal constitutional and corporate governance, some Seminoles believed
that the federal supervision inherent and endemic to tribal governments was
holding the tribe back. The Bureau of Indian Affairs paid its own
employees to administer federal programs to Seminole constituents, and
many Seminoles believed the federal government had interfered with
internal tribal governance, including the election of 1967, where non-White
town moiety clans had been elected to leadership positions.47 Howard E.
Tommie, tribal chairman during the 1970s, stated his support for replacing
BIA employees with tribal members:
Of course, we had a Bureau of Indian Affairs. I do not want to say
anything bad about them, but it is a bureaucracy. For some reason or
another, they seem to do whatever their guidelines are, which are very
minimal. They have never lived here like I do . . . . For a guy sitting
over there with a GS 15, 20, 30, whatever it is, I could hire two people
and a secretary with that money.48
He added that “federal purse strings” encouraged opportunistic Indians
to take advantage of the system and added an unwelcome level of
corruption to tribal governance.49
In 1976, the Seminoles first turned to opening smokeshops to generate
government revenue and establish a growing tribal economy, selling
cigarettes tax-free.50 Adding in the federal self-determination contract
revenues “from 1968 to 1977[,] the tribal income soared from $600,000 to
$4.5 million per year . . . .”51 Broward County Sheriff Edward Stack,
supported by a local cigarette vendor that competed with the Seminole
smokeshops, unsuccessfully sued the state to force it to implement its tax

46
See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203
(1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450a); see also Indian Self–Determination Amendments of
1987, Pub. L. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285 (1988) (establishing tribal self-governance demonstration
project); Indian Self–Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. 103–413, 108 Stat. 4250 (1994)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 458aa) (making tribal self-governance project permanent).
47
See King, supra note 25, at 150-51.
48 KERSEY, AN ASSUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at 117.
49
See id. at 117-18.
50
See id. at 121.
51
Id.
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regime on the Seminoles.52 The State Legislature enacted a statute
authorizing the tribe to continue selling tax-free smokes, which has since
been amended to encourage negotiation of tribal-state tax agreements.53
But selling smokes was not enough. Tax-free tobacco sales generated
about $1.5 million for the tribe in the early years.54 Seminole gaming,
according to former chairman James Billie, started with a realization that
reliance upon the Federal Government was no guarantee of sustainable
tribal independence, autonomy, and sovereignty. Federal recognition made
the Seminole Tribe eligible for federal services and additional federal grant
money, but as Billie stated, “[t]he United States wasn’t built on grants.”55
Seminole nationhood would not be either. A year after the bingo hall
opened, bingo revenue hit $1 million per month and smokeshop revenue,
bolstered by the bingo business, reached $800,000 per month.56
The local government response to the Seminole Tribe’s bingo
operations was predictable and typical for the time. Embodied by Broward
County Sheriff Robert Butterworth, the governmental response to the
Seminole bingo facility was to threaten to shut down the facility by force;
that is, “make arrests.”57 Sheriff Butterworth repeatedly threatened to close
the facility, but, after a federal judge enjoined local action to regulate the
tribe, he settled for the court’s allowance of deputies in the bingo facility.58
That the tribe sued to enjoin Sheriff Butterworth moved the conflict from
the law enforcement realm into the courtroom, but in either case, the
discussion over tribal revenue generation would be between adversaries.
It is important to interject that tribal-state-municipal relations often are
adversarial, but it is entirely unclear why this is so. Sheriff Butterworth and
his focus on law enforcement authority over the Seminole Tribe forced the
controversy into a far more adversarial mode than necessary. It did not
have to be that way. For example, in the microcosm of Seminole tribal
bingo in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the anecdotal evidence suggests
that the local population strongly supported tribal bingo:
[T]he men and women who come from as far as Chicago and New
York to play bingo on the Seminole reservation don’t like the idea that
52 See id.; Vending Unlimited, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Bus. Reg., Div. of Alcoholic Beverages &
Tobacco, 364 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
53 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 210.1801 (West 2010).
54 KERSEY, AN ASSUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at 127.
55 Seminole Indians try bingo to raise money, LAKELAND LEDGER (Fla.), Dec. 10, 1979, at 4B.
56 Tom Tiede, Seminoles Testing Florida Sovereignty, HARLAN (KY.) DAILY ENTER, Jan. 14,
1981, at 8B.
57 KERSEY, AN ASSUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at 128.
58 See Bingo! Seminole Indian—and Players—Hit Jackpot, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 17,
1979, at 2B (“Roettger’s ruling will allow deputies to enter the bingo parlor, but they will not be allowed
to use any evidence they gather.”).
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Butterworth might close down the 1,200 seat hall.
“I think it stinks,” Dorothy Sena, a local retailer. “I think the Indians
are entitled. They’ve been done out of so much, they deserve a break.”
“Why do they bother the poor Indians?” demanded a woman from
Venice, who wouldn’t give her name. “At least they’re not out on
welfare – they’re out trying to make a living. It’s their country, too.
They helped found it.”59
Still Sheriff Butterworth argued that tribal bingo violated state and local law
and alleged that Seminole business partners had links to organized crime.60
Butterworth revealed no legal or factual support for these positions but still
maintained the lead in responding and reacting to the Seminole bingo
initiative.
What is most confusing, almost comically, about the rhetoric in
opposition to Seminole bingo is the essentializing of Seminole culture.
Opponents, both public and official, expressed disappointment in the
Seminole bingo operations because, in their view, Indians should not be
engaging in such an ignoble activity. In 1982, the Seminole Tribe opened a
bingo hall in Tampa, Florida, alleged “to be used only for a museum and a
burial ground for the remains of Seminoles who were held captive at a fort
during the Seminole War of 1835.”61 Newspaper reports highlight
commentators denigrating the tribe for not being “noble” by engaging in
stereotypical tribal activities like selling little “canoes,” but rather utilizing
gaming to generate governmental revenue. This response is also typical
nationally. Again and again, gaming opponents argue that Indians have
cultural strength and tribal gaming undermines Indian culture. If a major
goal of tribal governance is to preserve and protect Indian cultures, which it
is, and tribal governance is impossible absent sufficient tribal government
revenues, then tribal economic development is critical to tribal governance
and Indian cultures.
Put differently, Indian gaming is a twentieth century response to
difficult governance circumstances, analogous to nineteenth century violent

59
See e.g., Anne S. Crowley, Bingo Becomes Indians’ Best Revenge; Sheriff Trying to Head
Tribe Off At Pass, DAYTONA BEACH MORNING J., July 11, 1981, at 9C.
60
See Janet Guyon, Those Pesky Indians Are Causing Trouble Again—with Bingo; A Florida
Sheriff Attempts To Close Seminole Parlor; A ‘Nightmare’ for Lawmen, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1980, at 1
(“[Butterworth’s] office, which investigated Seminole Bingo for several months, hints darkly that
Seminole Management may be linked with organized crime.”).
61
Robert Barnes, Seminoles Open Bingo Parlor to Overslow Crowd, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
June 2, 1982, at 1B.
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opposition to American military adventuring.
Tribal governmental
response to outrageously unfavorable circumstances may be affected and
informed by tribal culture, but tribal governmental response itself is not
tribal culture. Recall that tribal governance is about survival first and
foremost, even if that means engaging in activities many people find
distasteful and that many governments regulate as vice. Tribal governance
is also about the restoration of tribal lands and culture, which are
inextricably intertwined.
The Seminole Tribe’s initiative to engage in high stakes bingo as a
response to poverty, land dispossession, federal control of governance, and
chronically underfunded governmental resources is wholly consistent with
tribal governmental responses to adversity. Survival is a complicated
endeavor, driven by desperation.
Seminole tribal leadership’s rhetorical responses to the law
enforcement and litigation strategy, bolstered by rhetorical attacks in the
newspapers, were powerful: “‘I was screwed out of my land (in the past),’
said Chairman James Billie. ‘Believe me, I still remember those things.
The battle goes on every day.’”62
III. THE STATE’SVICTORY IN Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.
The Seminole Tribe stayed in the forefront of Indian gaming nationally
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, even though the Tribe suffered a painful
loss at the Supreme Court in 1996.
Sheriff Butterworth’s crusade to control Seminole bingo finally came
to an end in 1982, when the Supreme Court declined to hear Butterworth’s
appeal.63 The Tribe prevailed in the Fifth Circuit on the theory that, even
though Florida could assert its criminal laws inside of Seminole reservation
lands through Public Law 280, bingo was not within the purview of any
criminal statute under principles of Federal Indian law.64 A few years later,
the Supreme Court adopted substantially the same theory in California’s
challenge to Indian bingo.65
In that case, the Seminole Tribe filed an amicus brief detailing its
experiences with bingo and, implicitly, with Sheriff Butterworth.66 The key
portion of the brief highlighted the positive governance aspects of bingo

62

Crowley, supra note 59, at 9C (emphasis added).
See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1020 (1982).
64
See id. at 311.
65
See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
66
See Brief for Seminole Tribe of Florida & the Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
of Minnesota as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
480 U.S. 202 (1987) (No. 85-1708), 1986 WL 728103.
63
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revenue:
A primary source of income is bingo. Seminole bingo commenced in
1979. Since then those profits have enabled the Tribe to enhance the
health, housing, education, law enforcement, and communications
needs of tribal members in ways that are both basic and extraordinary.
In 1982 a multi-purpose community center was built on the Hollywood
Reservation to house a day care center, a senior citizens center, and a
health care center. Tribal member homes on the Big Cypress,
Brighton, and Hollywood Reservations were rehabilitated in 1980 and
1982 to bring them up to code requirements. In 1984 and 1985[,]
Community Centers were constructed in Big Cypress and Brighton to
house senior citizens, day care, and education programs. These
facilities were all partially funded by the Tribe’s revenues. Last year a
medical social worker was hired, paid solely by the Tribe. The Tribe
provides funds for nutrition programs, health delivery systems,
commodity food programs, community care for the elderly, and adult
education programs.
Between 1945 and 1977 an average of 4.3 tribal members per
year graduated from high school. From 1978 to 1986, there were an
average of thirteen high school graduates per year. From 1945 to 1977
nine tribal members received college or junior college degrees. From
1978 to 1986 twenty-eight members graduated from college or junior
college, including one person who received a master[‘]s degree, and
another who received a law degree. The Tribe now provides
scholarships for worthy students, and of the twenty-seven identifiable
special education programs available to tribal members, twenty are
either wholly or partially funded by the Tribe.
Since 1982[,] the Tribe has funded a Seminole Cultural
Education program which operates on all the residential reservations.
The program, which utilizes bilingual University of Miami specialists
and other experts, seeks to retain the cultural values, knowledge, and
language of the Seminoles and heighten the awareness of the Seminole
children to the uniqueness of their heritage.
A tribal newspaper, the Seminole Tribune, began publication in
1983 and is distributed to all tribal members as well as government
offices, other Tribes, and various others interested in news of the
Seminoles.
Finally, in 1981[,] the Seminole Police Department was created
with law enforcement jurisdiction over the separate reservation areas.
In the 1985-86 fiscal year[,] the Department employed 26 full time
personnel, with the Tribe bearing approximately 85 percent of the total
cost of the Department’s budget. The remaining portion is funded by
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the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The Department has been successful in
apprehending non-Indian narcotics violators and[,] in the past two
years[,] has confiscated two planes and several vehicles engaged in
narcotics violations in Indian country.
Bingo revenues have been an important part of the Seminole
Tribe’s ability to enhance and protect the lives of its members.67
The strategic value added by the Seminole brief to the litigation
strategy for tribal interests was a refutation of the claims of California—and
states like Florida—that Indian gaming would be infiltrated by organized
crime.68 The Seminole Tribe alleged no such evidence existed, and, if the
Court remanded to order an evidentiary hearing on the question, “[w]e are
confident that if such a hearing were to occur, California’s argument to this
Court would be found to be devoid of factual merit.”69 Moreover,
according to the Tribe, it made no logical sense for tribes to loosely regulate
their own revenue stream; “Indian bingo is limited, readily identifiable,
easily monitored, and extensively regulated by the Tribes. That is so since
the Tribes’ financial well-being depends upon the games being honestly run
and the generated income being closely monitored.”70
The Court agreed with the arguments by the Seminole Tribe and others
that a state’s interest in quelling organized crime was insufficient to allow
state regulation of Indian bingo:
The State insists that the high stakes offered at tribal games are
attractive to organized crime, whereas the controlled games authorized
under California law are not. This is surely a legitimate concern, but
we are unconvinced that it is sufficient to escape the pre-emptive force
of federal and tribal interests apparent in this case. California does not
allege any present criminal involvement in the Cabazon and Morongo
enterprises, and the Ninth Circuit discerned none. An official of the
Department of Justice has expressed some concern about tribal bingo
operations, but far from any action being taken evidencing this
concern.71
After tribal interests prevailed, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA).72

67

Id. at *5-7.
See RALPH A. ROSSUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND TRIBAL GAMING: CALIFORNIA V.
CABAZON BAND OF MISSION INDIANS 115 (2011).
69 Brief for Appellees, supra note 66, at *14.
70 Id. at *13.
71 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221 (1987) (footnote omitted).
72 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2721 (1988)).
68
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Indian gaming began to take off after the enactment of IGRA, but in
some quarters gaming grew more slowly than in others. The big sticking
point in many states was casino-style gaming—slot machines, poker,
blackjack, and the like. IGRA classified those games as “Class III”
gaming73 and required tribes to negotiate a compact with state governors
over the terms of Class III gaming.74 However, Congress would not
authorize Class III gaming in states where casino-style gaming was
completely prohibited.75
IGRA required governors to negotiate with tribes in good faith,76
presumably putting an end to the machinations of state officials like Sheriff
Butterworth, who routinely threatened to raid Seminole gaming properties
and arrest everyone present. If a state refused to negotiate in good faith,
Congress opened up federal courthouses to tribes to sue states.77 The good
faith negotiation obligation was the linchpin of the federal gaming act—
Congress believed tribes and states would not negotiate successfully unless
forced to do so:
Under IGRA states could effectively veto any class III gaming on
Indian land simply by refusing to negotiate a compact. Section
2710(d)(7) restored some leverage to the tribes by giving them the
right to sue recalcitrant states and thereby forcing them to enter into a
compact. . . . It is quite clear from the structure of the statute that the
tribe’s right to sue the state is a key part of a carefully-crafted scheme
balancing the interests of the tribes and the states. It therefore seems
highly unlikely that Congress would have passed one part without the
other, leaving the tribes essentially powerless.78
As the Ninth Circuit noted, Senator Inouye, the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs during the time Congress enacted IGRA,
asserted that IGRA would not have been passed, but for the right of tribes to
sue state governors for failure to negotiate in good faith:
Because I believe that if we had known at the time we were
considering the bill—if we had known that this proposal of tribal state
compacts that came from the States and was strongly supported by the
States, would later be rendered virtually meaningless by the action of
those states which have sought to avoid entering into compacts by
asserting the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to defeat federal court

73
74
75
76
77
78

See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (2014).
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2014).
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2014).
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (2014).
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (2014).
United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1998).
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jurisdiction, we would not have gone down this path.79
In Florida, where slot machines and banking games like blackjack
were flatly illegal, but poker, off-track betting, roulette, and jai alai were
not, the state was uninterested in negotiating with the Seminoles on Class
III games.80 The Tribe successfully brought suit in 1991 alleging that the
state failed to comply with IGRA’s good faith negotiation requirement.81
However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that Congress had no
authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Commerce
Clause.82 The Supreme Court, as is now well known, affirmed, holding in a
sweeping ruling that Congress has no authority under the Commerce Clause
to abrogate state sovereign immunity.83 The Seminole Tribe could not force
the state to enter into a Class III compact.
The Seminole Tribe decision upended the balance between tribes and
states sought by Congress in enacting IGRA. Commentators argued
forcefully that Congress should enact a “Seminole fix” of sorts:
Seminole Tribe invalidated the key compromise of IGRA—Congress’s
attempt to balance state and tribal bargaining power through a judicial
enforcement mechanism that allowed tribes to sue states. Without that
corrective device in place, state political power exceeds that of tribes,
creating an imbalance in gaming negotiations. With inherent tribal
sovereignty as the foundation for a level playing field, however, it is
plain that the current negotiating status of tribes and states requires a
new corrective mechanism in order to facilitate mutually respectful
government-to-government relations. We believe that Congress
should enact legislation to restore an appropriate balance of tribal and
state authority over Indian gaming.84
The Seminoles would not wait for Congress, however. Neither would
former Sheriff Butterworth, who would later be elected to be the Attorney

79 Id. at 1300 (quoting Implementation of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Oversight Hearings
Before the House Subcommittee on Native American Affairs of the Committee on Natural Resources,
103rd Cong. 63 (1993)).
80 See Lourdes Rodriguez-Florido, Rolling the Dice: Seminoles Explore Ways to Bring Casino
Games to Reservation, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 28, 1991, available at 1991 WLNR 4012652.
81 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 656 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (denying
State of Florida’s motion to dismiss).
82 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1019 (11th Cir. 1994).
83 See generally Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik, Sovereignties—Federal, State, and Tribal:
The Story of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 329 (Vicki C. Jackson
& Judith Resnik eds., 2010); Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian
Commerce Clause, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3 (1997); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State
Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
84 STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT & KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN GAMING & TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY:
THE CASINO COMPROMISE 157 (2005).
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General for the State of Florida.85
IV. SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATING THE REWORKED LANDSCAPE.
The Seminoles had been defeated but employed a series of strategies
that largely succeeded in forcing Florida’s hand beginning in the late 1990s.
By 1999, high stakes bingo and other Class II gaming generated about $96
million in revenues for the Tribe.86 Adding casino-style gaming might
“quadruple” Seminole gaming revenues.87
In the first strategy, the Seminole Tribe intended to take advantage of
the new Department of Interior regulations designed to work around the
Supreme Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe.88 The Supreme Court’s
holding that tribes may not sue states or their officials to enforce the good
faith negotiations requirement eliminated the procedure by which tribes
could still acquire a Class III gaming compact through a mediator.89
Immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision, former Congressional
staffer Alexander Skibine remarked that Congress likely would have
selected the Secretary of Interior as the route for tribes victimized by state
refusals to negotiate in good faith: “[h]ad we known that Congress could
not waive the state’s sovereign immunity, there is no doubt in my mind that
we would have selected the Secretary of the Interior as the recourse in cases
where states failed to negotiate in good faith.”90
Second, the Seminole Tribe had already taken advantage of advances
in video game technology to begin using electronic enhancements to Class
II bingo machines.91 The United States believed that the games used by the
Seminoles constituted illegal “electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of
games of chance defined . . . as Class III gaming.”92 Seminole efforts to

85
See Butterworth to Battle Indians’ Casino Gambling, VERO BEACH PRESS J., April 12, 1999,
at A10, available at 1999 WLNR 6153716.
86
See Jeff Testerman, Indian Casinos Lawsuit Likely, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, April 11, 1999,
at 1A, available at 1999 WLNR 2608483 (“About eighty percent of the tribe’s estimated $120-million
annual budget is financed by gambling revenues. The money comes from high-stakes bingo, low-stakes
poker and electronic slot machines at bingo halls on Seminole reservation land in Hollywood, Tampa,
Immokalee and Brighton.”).
87
See id. (“Billie has said adding full casino gambling might quadruple the tribe’s gambling
profits.”).
88
See Class III Gaming Procedures, 64 Fed. Reg. 17, 535 (Apr. 12, 1999) (codified as 25 C.F.R.
pt. 291 (2004)).
89
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv)-(vii) (2014).
90
Hearing on Review of Court Decision on Indian Gambling Before the S. Indian Affairs
Comm., 104th Cong. 40 (1996) (statement of Alex Tallchief Skibine, Professor of Law, Univ. of Utah).
91
See Jeff Testerman, Indian Casinos Lawsuit Likely, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, April 11, 1999,
at 1A, available at 1999 WLNR 2608483.
92
Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Permanent Injunctive Relief at 6, ¶ 16,
United States v. Seminole Tribe of Florida (1997), (No. 97-1481-Civ-T-17(A)), 1997 WL 33827786.
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end the federal lawsuit failed.93 But when the State of Florida—led by
Attorney General Butterworth—sued to enjoin the electronic machines, the
federal court dismissed the suit under tribal immunity principles.94
Ironically, had Florida entered into a gaming compact with the Seminoles, it
is likely the court would have found that either Congress had abrogated, or
the tribe had waived, immunity.95
While the Department of Interior’s procedures for Class III
compacting have not been successful96—Florida was one of the states that
sued the Department of Interior over the Class III procedures97—the debate
over electronic enhancements to Class II bingo machines has largely been
won by tribal interests, including the Seminole Tribe.98
Even so, the Seminole Tribe never stopped seeking a Class III compact
with the State of Florida. In November 2007, the Seminole Tribe finally
negotiated a Class III gaming compact with a Florida governor, Charles
Crist. However, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Governor Crist had
no authority to enter into the gaming compact.99
After more political wrangling, the Florida Legislature finally
authorized Governor Crist to execute a gaming compact with the Seminole

93

See United States v. Seminole Tribe of Indians, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
See Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 181 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Because the
State and the Tribe have not entered into a compact in this case, we hold that Congress has not abrogated
the Tribe’s immunity from the State’s suit.”).
95 See id.
96 See e.g., Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 511 (5th Cir. 2007) (“The Secretarial
Procedures violate the unambiguous language of IGRA and congressional intent by bypassing the
neutral judicial process that centrally protects the state’s role in authorizing tribal Class III gaming[]”),
cert. denied sub nom., Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Texas, 555 U.S. 811 (2008).
97 See Role & Funding of the National Indian Gaming Commission: Oversight Hearing on the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Before the S. Indian Affairs Comm., 108th Cong. 90 (2003) (prepared
statement of Aurene M. Martin, Acting Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs, Dept. of the Interior).
98 See e.g., Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 327 F.3d 1019, 1044
(10th Cir. 2003) (“Accordingly, we follow the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, and, applying the NIGC’s
definition, hold that the Machine is a Class II technologic aid. [T]he appellees’ use of the Machine in
Indian country is therefore insulated from liability based on the Johnson Act’s ban on gambling
devices.”), cert. denied, Ashcroft v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla., 54 U.S. 1218 (2004); United States
v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb., 324 F.3d 607, 616 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Because we conclude that the Lucky
Tab II machines are not prohibited Johnson Act gambling devices and are not prohibited ‘facsimiles’
within the meaning of 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7), the Tribe is not conducting class III gaming in contravention
of the federal court’s prior order. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.”), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1229 (2004); Diamond Game Enters, Inc. v. Reno, 230 F.3d 365, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“We
see no principled difference between the Tab Force and the Lucky Tab II. Both devices electronically
‘read’ paper pull-tabs and display their contents on a screen, and neither can ‘change the outcome of the
game.’ [N]either contains an internal computer that generates the game. Rather, both machines facilitate
the playing of paper pull-tabs. They are thus Class II aids.”).
99 See Florida House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied,
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida House of Representatives, 555 U.S. 1212 (2009).
94
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Tribe; they concluded a deal in 2010.100 Under the compact, the Seminole
Tribe agreed to pay twelve percent of the profits from its casinos for the
first $2 billion, fifteen percent from profits above $2 billion, and so on.101
The compact was initially expected to generate “a windfall of more than
$435 million for lawmakers. . . .”102 At a minimum, the compact guaranteed
$1 billion in payments to the state for the first five years.103
In 2013, the Florida Legislature commissioned a gaming impact study
that concluded “the various gambling subsectors (racinos/pari-mutuels,
lottery, and Native American casinos) . . . are highly productive industries
and generate a considerable amount of direct economic output to
Florida.”104
The only question is why it took so long for the State and the Tribe to
reach this deal.
CONCLUSION
In 2010, the Seminole Tribe agreed to pay the National Indian Gaming
Commission a $500,000 fine for violations of the Tribe’s Revenue
Allocation Plan.105 The Tribe also agreed to establish an internal audit
department to review payments to tribal members from the Tribe’s gaming
revenues.106 Earlier that year, the National Indian Gaming Commission
issued a Notice of Violation to the Tribe for several payments made to
individual tribal members.107 One of the payments went to the Tribe’s

100
See Dara Kam, State Bets on Seminoles in Gambling Deal, PALM BEACH POST, April 7,
2010, at 1A.
101
See Gaming Compact Between the Seminole Tribe of Florida and the State of Florida, pt.
XI(B)(1)(b)(i)-(vi), FLA. DEP’T OF BUSINESS & PROF’L REGULATION (effective Apr. 7, 2010) (codified
at
Fla.
Stat.
§
285.701(3)),
available
at
http://www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/pmw/documents/2010_Compact-Signed1.pdf.
102
Brandon Larrabee, Senate Passes Seminole Gambling Deal: Bill Would Formally Allow
Tribe to Run Seven Casinos, FLA. TIMES UNION, April 15, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 7852486.
103
See Dara Kam, Florida Cashing in on Seminole Gambling Money, BUS. J. (Jacksonville),
Oct. 23, 2013 (“The 2010 deal, known as a compact, guarantees the tribe will make minimum annual
payments, totaling $1 billion over five years, to the state.”).
104
SPECTRUM GAMING GROUP, GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY 291 (2013), available at
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/GamingStudy/docs/FGIS_Spectrum_28Oct2013.pdf.
105
See Agreed To Civil Fine Assessment-Seminole Tribe of Florida, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING
COMM’N,
CFA-10-01,
at
4,
¶
13
(Oct.
27,
2010)
available
at
http://www.nigc.gov/LinkClick.aspx?link=NIGC+
Uploads%2freadingroom%2fenforcementactions%2fseminolefl%2fCFA-1001.pdf&tabid=124&mid=774.
106
See id. at 2-3, ¶ 12.
107
See Notice of Violation—Seminole Tribe of Florida, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, (June
3,
2010),
available
at
http://www.nigc.gov/LinkClick.aspx?link=NIGC+Uploads%2freadingroom%2fenforcementactions
%2fseminolefl%2fNOV-10-01.pdf&tabid=124&mid=774.
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housing department to pay for the relocation of a tribal member, but this
payment of $19,800 was about $17,000 more than the cap imposed on such
payments by the Tribe’s own policies.108 Another check, this time for
$10,000, went for a Christmas party held six months earlier, without
justifying receipts.109 The Tribe’s credit rating suffered as a result of the
violations, but has since improved.110
Tribal governance in the Twenty-First Century is an odd thing to most
Americans. One commentator alleges that “[p]olitically, gaming operations
have proven fairly disastrous for both tribes as well as for the sovereignty of
Native American tribes across the nation.”111 What an incredibly naïve, if
not fundamentally ethnocentric, statement! Tribal governance capacity has
improved at tribes like Seminole quickly and dramatically because of
Indian gaming. Internal tribal politics has changed as a result, in ways that
are both good and bad. But to say gaming has been a political disaster is
just silly.
Tribal government officials, in general, are far more accountable to
their constituents than federal, state, and municipal officials are to their
constituents. And tribal leaders are accountable to constituents more than
merely via electoral politics or hearing out citizen complaints. Tribal
accountability means that everyone has a chance to be heard, “[during
Green Corn ceremonies,] all their laws are made and they pow-wow for
days and days until all have been heard who have anything to suggest for
the good of the tribe.”112
Political accountability, coupled with improved government resources
and capacity, encourages tribal leaders to make decisions that to outsiders
might be downright strange, if not troubling. Why else would tribal leaders
issue large checks to tribal members for housing assistance outside of
normal procedures? The Seminole Tribe paid the price to federal regulators
for these moments of weakness or perhaps even ineptitude. But that’s
sovereignty.

108 See id. at 5-6, ¶ 6. There was a second similar payment for housing expenses the Commission
found to be a violation as well. See id. at 7-8, ¶ 9.
109 See id. at 6-7, ¶ 8.
110 See Fitch Ratings Upgrades Seminole Tribe Credit, SEMINOLE TRIBUNE (Hollywood, Fla.),
May 31, 2013, at 2A (“These credit improvements are supported by Fitch’s ‘increased comfort with the
Tribe’s governance and fiscal management’ since Fitch downgraded the Tribe in 2010 following a
Notice of Violation (NOV) from the National Indian Gaming Commission.”).
111 PHILIP S. CARRASCO, EVALUATING THE EFFICACY OF NATIVE AMERICAN GAMING
OPERATIONS:
A
FLORIDA
CASE
STUDY
9,
available
at
http://www.sarasota.usf.edu/academics/cas/capstone/2013-2014/interdisciplinary%20social
%20sciences/carrasco_evaluating%20the%20legal%20success%20of%20native%20american%20gamin
g%20operations-a%20florida%20case%20study%20.pdf.
112 See [No title available], WASH. POST., Dec. 4, 1894, at 12 (emphasis added).

FLETCHER_PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

10/16/2014 3:17 PM

The Seminole Tribe & the Origins of Indian Gaming

275

In 1979, when the Seminole Tribe opened its bingo hall, state official
response was wholly inadequate and misguided. It may be easy to say that
in hindsight, but now that the tribe has agreed to contribute over $1 billion
to the state treasury starting in 2010—and still no evidence of organized
crime—one wonders what the State of Florida was doing from 1979 to
2010. The state sovereign expended millions fighting tribal gaming instead
of profiting from a sovereign-to-sovereign business relationship, doing so
for twenty-two years after Congress provided a procedure to create that
relationship and fourteen years after winning against the tribe in the
Supreme Court. The political disaster in Florida is the state’s failure to
accept money offered by the Seminole Tribe.
For the Tribe, the reasons for establishing a legally questionable
business operation were clear—to generate revenue to operate a tribal
government. And like many Tribes (but far from all), the Tribe has been
successful. That is all that gaming is.

